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FOCUSED DISCUSSION PEER-REVIEWED
Concepts as Tools in the Experimental
Generation of Knowledge in Cognitive
Neuropsychology∗
Uljana Feest†
This paper asks (a) how new scientific objects of research are
conceptualized at a point in time when little is known about
them, and (b) how those conceptualizations, in turn, figure in the
process of investigating the phenomena in question. Contrasting
my approach with existing notions of concepts and situating
it in relation to existing discussions about the epistemology of
experimentation, I propose to think of concepts as research tools.
I elaborate on the conception of a tool that informs my account.
Narrowing my focus to phenomena in cognitive neuropsychology, I
then illustrate my thesis with the example of the concept of implicit
memory. This account is based on an original reconstruction of the
nature and function of operationism in psychology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Let me start out by describing what I take to be the prima facie puzzle
when talking about concepts in the context of scientific research: In order
to investigate a given phenomenon, one has to be able to empirically
individuate instances of it. In order to be able to do so, one has to
possess some concept of the phenomenon. The possession of a concept
is generally taken to imply knowledge about the class of phenomena that
it applies to. But how do we make sense of concept use in cases where
scientists investigate phenomena or objects they don’t know much about,
or perhaps aren’t even sure really exist? Clearly they must use concepts
when conducting their research. The question that interests me here is
what concepts have to be like, such that they can play a role in the
empirical generation of knowledge.
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U. Feest Concepts as Tools
In this paper I will suggest that we think of concepts as tools in
the investigative process. They are tools for knowledge generation, and
like other tools they can be adapted or discarded in the process. More
specifically, I propose an account of operational definitions that explicates
how concepts can fulfill this task, and I present an account of a recent
episode in the history of cognitive psychology to demonstrate my thesis.
My account of concepts as research tools differs from existing accounts
of concepts by virtue of the fact that I ask a different question than
they typically ask. In the philosophical literature, the question about the
relationship between concepts and what we know about their referents
is usually asked by either asking about the semantics of the words that
correspond to the concepts, or by asking about the epistemology of
finding out that an object really has the properties ascribed to it by a
given concept. In contrast, I will argue that if we are interested in the
role of concepts in knowledge acquisition, it is instructive to ask (1) not
what a given concept means, but rather what scientists take it to mean,
and how the scientists’ taking-the-concept-to-mean-something can play a
productive role in empirical research, and (2) not whether an already fully
formed concept is really a good instrument for individuating an object, but
how the concept is developed in the process of using it as an instrument.
Before I proceed to present my account, let me emphasize that I
explicate my approach in relation to a couple of well known existing
accounts of concepts mainly for expository purposes. It is not the point
of this article to develop a general theory of concepts. To phrase this
differently, it is not my aim to make a contribution to questions about
meaning and reference that have been debated in the philosophy of
language for a long time. Rather, I wish to draw attention to an entirely
different set of questions–questions about experimental knowledge
generation–which, I claim, can be elucidated by thinking about the role
of concepts in experimental practice in the way proposed here.
II. THE CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE AND THE INVESTIGATIVE
PROCESS
In the literature on concepts, scholars sometimes distinguish between
the “classical” theory of concepts and “non-classical” theories of concepts
(e.g., Laurence and Margolis 1999). According to the classical theory,
concepts have a definitional structure, which provides necessary and
sufficient conditions of application for the words that correspond to the
concepts. This definitional structure, furthermore, is frequently equated
with what Frege termed the sense (as opposed to the reference) of the
concept. Possession of a concept enables the subject to identify objects
that are in the extension of the concept. The best-known instances of the
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classical theory of concepts can be found in forms of empiricism, which
are commonly held to assume that concepts can be defined in terms of
observational features.
There are two groups of standard reasons for why the classical
view failed, namely (1) counterexamples, which show that almost any
definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions excludes cases
we intuitively take to be in the extension of the concept, and vice versa, and
(2) psychological evidence to the effect that concept formation/application
does not work the way suggested by the classical theory (e.g., Rosch
1978). This latter type of work has in turn given rise to work that
models conceptual change in science on cognitive theories of concepts
(e.g., Andersen et al. 2006). Interesting as this latter work is, I shall
not be paying attention to it here, as my interest does not lie with the
cognitive mechanisms of developing and applying concepts, but with the
methodological role of assuming that certain concepts apply in the context
of scientific research. By “methodological role” I mean the role of enabling
subjects to conduct research about purported objects, that is, objects
whose existence and characteristics are still in question. To understand the
desiderata of such an analysis it will be helpful to review some responses
to the classical theory of concepts and its successors.
There are two well-known theoretical responses to the problem with the
classical theory of concepts just outlined. Roughly, we may identify them
as the description theory of meaning and the causal theory of reference,
which are associated with the names of Willard Van Orman Quine and
Hilary Putnam respectively. Each of these theories of meaning, I would
like to suggest, explicates some ideas we have about scientific concepts,
namely (in the case of the description theory) that they are revisable and
(in the case of the causal theory) that they have stable referents, which do
not change simply because our concepts of them change. However, both
theories of meaning fall short of providing an analysis of how concepts
can figure in the generation of knowledge. This need not necessarily be a
shortcoming, since these theories do not aim at providing an account of
knowledge generation. Given my own interest in this question, it is helpful
to review in which ways they fail to answer it. I will start with the causal
theory.
The best-known formulation of the causal theory was provided by
Putnam in his 1975 “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’” This paper takes as a
point of departure the fact that scientists sometimes fundamentally change
their most basic concept of a given object, and yet continue to talk as if
they were still talking about the same object. A well-known instance of
this is provided by the fact that non-Euclidean geometry radically altered
the concept of physical space, yet scientists continued to assume that
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the term “physical space” referred to the same phenomenon before and
after this change. Putnam’s causal theory of reference is an attempt to
justify this practice by saying that a word’s meaning gets fixed when it is
first introduced into the language (based on the object that was present
at the time). This ensures the idea of a stable referent of a word in the
absence of a well thought-out concept of what it refers to. However, as
has variously been pointed out, one problem with this account is that
it is unable to predict what happens when people start using the term
in a way that is either broader or narrower than before. The causal
theory has to argue in both cases that people are either misapplying
the concept, or that the concept had the broader/narrower extension all
along. An example provided by Gary Ebbs (2003) makes this point: In
the seventeenth century, people used the term “gold” to refer to both
what we today refer to as gold and as platinum, based on observational
similarities between the two substances. Once it was determined that they
have different atomic numbers, the extension of the concept was narrowed
down. As Ebbs argues, it is equally conceivable that people might simply
have distinguished between two kinds of gold. The point is that there are no
a priori philosophical arguments available to predict which way a particular
linguistic community will develop their concepts: “what we actually say
when we find ourselves in previously unimagined situations almost always
trumps our earlier speculations about what we would say if we were to
find ourselves in that situation” (Ebbs 2003, 252). He suggests that our
practical judgment of sameness-of-denotation across time is much more
robust than any of the strategies that people have appealed to in order to
justify it: “we trust these judgments unless we have some special reason
to doubt or revise them” (Ebbs 2003, 252).1
I would like to adopt this proposal here. It makes room for the notion that
scientists view their phenomena of research as relatively stable features of
the world, in the sense of Bogen and Woodward (1988), but also that they
can at times revise a concept to the point of giving up the very idea that
the phenomenon even exists. In addition, I suggest that the judgment of
sameness of denotation is a prerequisite for research on a given purported
object. It is in this practical reliance on scientific judgments about the
denotations of concepts that provides a first, minimal, explication of my
contention that concepts can be tools in the generation of knowledge. But
of course, so far nothing has been said about the question of how such
tools are used. In order to get a clearer sense of that, we need to say more
1 Ebbs’s criticism is directed both at older formulations of the causal theory of meaning
and at more recent refined versions, such as the one presented in two-dimensional
semantics (e.g., Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1998).
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about empirical criteria of application for the concept. After all, the notion
that scientists work with the assumption of a stable object of research,
does not, in and of itself, give us any indication as to how they go about
recognizing instances of it, let alone how they proceed in their attempts
to find out more about it. In other words, we need to say more about the
descriptive features specified by a concept.
III. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF
DISCOVERY
Since my focus here is on experimental investigations, I shall assume
that the relevant descriptive features are a result of, and play a role
in, experimental interventions. This focus on experimental interventions
comes with a proposal to think of the descriptive features of a concept
not in terms of whether they can adequately represent the object
under investigation, but how they enable experimental interventions in
the process of investigating the purported or ill-understood object. The
basic idea here is that concepts figure as tools for the investigation of
such objects. As such they can contribute to experimental knowledge
generation, but they can also be refined and discarded in the process.
Operational Definitions and the Logic of Disposition Terms
I am proposing here a notion of operational definition as an analysis of
how concepts fulfill this task. My understanding of operational definitions
differs from the usual philosophical usage of the expression. There, it
is often taken (and therefore rejected) as a particularly clear example
of the classical theory of concepts. One well-known point of reference
here is Percy Bridgman’s remark that a “concept is synonymous with
the corresponding set of operations” (Bridgman 1927, 5). Now, it is an
open question whether Bridgman really intended his thesis to make
a contribution to a theory of meaning in the sense of verificationist
semantics. Rather, he wanted to caution scientists not to assume
uncritically that two experiments really operationalize the same concepts,
that is, pick out the same phenomenon.2 However, even if we read
Bridgman’s thesis as one about semantics, it would have to be read as a
thesis about the semantics of a specific class of terms, namely disposition
terms (“if I were to perform operation x then observable event y would
occur”). Such terms–as Carnap recognized by 1936–do not easily lend
themselves to definitions by means of the classical theory of concepts.
This prompted Carnap to propose an analysis of disposition terms, which
2 See Chang (2009) for a discussion of Bridgman’s operationalism.
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did not provide necessary conditions of application. Instead he merely
suggested to specify the meaning of a disposition term in terms of one
specific condition of application (leaving open the possibility that it might
also apply in others).
Q1 → (Q3 iff Q2) (Carnap 1936, 443)
(e.g., “If an object is put into water, then it is water-soluble iff it dissolves.”)
My aim here is not to defend Carnap’s semantic analysis of disposition
terms, but rather to ask what experimental possibilities are opened up for
scientists if they conceptualize the purported referent of a given word in a
way that is analogous to this semantic analysis. Consider the following
hypothetical research scenario: we want to investigate the molecular
structure of water-soluble substances. In order to do so we need to identify
the members of our test class empirically. We can do so by specifying an
experimental set-up in which a sample of the substance is put in water to
see if it dissolves. Such specifications may well involve instructions about
the types of materials to use, as well as about the temperature of both the
room and the water. Notice that while some such specification is a vital
prerequisite for doing research on soluble substances, it is not infallible
or unrevisable. For example, it may later turn out that under the specified
conditions some water-soluble substances do not dissolve, or that some
appear to, but do not in fact, dissolve.
Operational Definitions as Providing Instructions for Experimental
Interventions
The basic point here is that we cannot even begin to study the
purported object of research (in this case, the molecular structure of
water-solubility) unless we work with a preliminary understanding of how to
empirically individuate the objects that possess it. Operational definitions
function as tools to this end by providing paradigmatic conditions of
application for the concepts in question. These are cast in terms of a
description of a typical experimental set-up thought to produce data that
are indicative of the phenomenon picked out by the concept. I base my
analysis of the role of operational definitions on several historical case
studies where I have traced the origins of talk about operationism in
psychology to psychophysics and behaviorism of the 1920s and 1930s
(see Feest 2005). Based on these historical case studies I have argued
that even though the psychologists in question saw themselves as closely
allied with logical positivists, they in fact pursued a rather different
intellectual project. Their research was not aimed at providing concepts
with meaning, but to conduct empirical investigations of the referents
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of concepts. In order to engage in this dynamic project, they had to
temporarily fixate conditions of application for the concepts in a way that
would allow them to perform experimental interventions.
In the recent literature in the philosophy of experimental neuroscience,
my account has found some support in an article by Jacqueline Sullivan
(2009), who shares my contention that “[a]n operational definition is built
directly into the design of an experimental paradigm” (Sullivan 2009, 514).
I take this way of talking about experimental paradigms to be highly
congenial to my own formulation (see above) that operational definitions
provide paradigmatic conditions of application for a given concept, thereby
specifying a standard procedure for the scientific investigation of the
phenomenon thought to be picked out by the concept (as distinct
from the more specific details of how this is implemented in particular
experiments).3 For example, as we will see in Section 5 below, a
common experimental paradigm for the study of memory calls for a
distinction between a study phase and a test phase. This paradigm
presupposes a particular understanding of memory as a phenomenon
whereby previously learned material can be retained and retrieved. Such
an underlying preconception is encapsulated in an operational definition,
which might state that if a subject is exposed to a particular learning task
then memory is present if and only if retention of the learned material
can be demonstrated in the test phase. My question in this paper is
how the fact that an operational definition is built into the design of
an experimental paradigm makes it possible to generate knowledge by
means of that experimental paradigm. My thesis is that operationally
defined concepts provide scientists with instructions about experimental
interventions designed to produce data that indicate the phenomenon of
interest. This is analogous to the way in which a physical tool might come
with instructions on how to physically intervene in the world in order to
achieve a particular goal.
Now, one might raise the question of whether the definition in question
is a valid tool. In other words: does the fact that a given operational
definition specifies empirical conditions of application for a given concept
mean that the concept in fact picks out the phenomenon of interest? The
answer is a very clear “no”: “[t]he strategy of investigators ... is to assume
that the operationalizations that they provide are actually indicative of the
function of interest” (Sullivan 2009, 518). This assumption may, of course,
turn out to be false, just like the assumption that a particular screwdriver is
adequate to the purpose of assembling a given piece of furniture may turn
3 See Sullivan (2009) for a more detailed analysis of the distinctions between
experimental designs, paradigms, protocols and sub-protocols.
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out to be false. While questions of validity are clearly pertinent, they are
not addressed in this paper. Here my focus is not on the question of how
the usage of a concept can be justified, but on providing a descriptively
accurate account of the practical work that is done by operationally defined
concepts in specific experimental contexts.
IV. ON THE NOTION OF A SCIENTIFIC TOOL
Up to this point I have used the word “tool” rather loosely. It will probably
be objected that the analogy between concepts and tools or instruments
is not very compelling, since (a) concepts are not physical devices like
hammers or screwdrivers, and (b) hammers and screwdrivers do not
perform the kind of epistemic function I have attributed to concepts, and
(c) when we use a physical tool, such as a screwdriver, we typically know
what kind of object it can be used on (e.g., a screw), but what are we to
make of a tool for “ill-understood” objects? In this section I hope to further
clarify my account by responding to all three objections. Answering to the
first charge, I will argue that there is no good reason to limit the meaning of
the word “tool” to physical devices. Answering to the second charge, I will
argue that in the sciences there are in fact plenty of tools that do perform
epistemic functions. Finally, in response to the third question, I will explain
my notion of the relationship between tool and object by comparing it with
Rheinberger’s notion of an epistemic object.
Why Tools Do Not Have to be Physical
A tool is a device that enables us to do something. In the context of
empirical research, we are interested in tools that enable scientists to
generate and analyze data. The latter of these two functions, that is, that
of analyzing data, already makes it quite clear that scientific tools do not
have to be physical devices, though they may make use of physical devices
in their execution. For example, when a scientist uses a statistical rule of
inference to test whether a particular empirical effect is significant, it is fair
to refer to this method as a tool, even though it is not a physical machine.
This does not necessarily mean that there are no physical machines
involved, as the rule of inference is often implemented in a physical device,
for example, a calculator or computer, which delivers the results of the data
analysis.
In the present context my focus is not on data-analyzing tools, but
on data-generating tools. My claim is that in psychology there are
data-generating tools that are not physical devices, at least not of any
very technologically sophisticated kind. A typical example of such tools
are psychological tests or questionnaires. There is, of course, a material
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realization of such tools, insofar as the test is presented on a piece of paper
or a computer screen, and insofar as the subjects’ responses are recorded
in some way or other. But the epistemic work of the tool is done by the ways
in which the questions are asked, not by the physical medium in which they
are presented. In this respect I am in full agreement with Sturm and Ash
(2005), who write that “there is no good reason to define the concept of
instrument or of psychological instruments in such a way that only physical
devices, let alone technologically advanced ones, are included” (Sturm
and Ash 2005, 15). But even if this is true, it does not follow that concepts
can be instances of such non-physical and non-mechanical tools. Nor does
it follow that they are tools for knowledge generation. In other words, my
argument requires two more steps. First, I need to specify the kind of tool
that I wish to compare concepts with. Second, I need to say more about
the notion of knowledge-generation presupposed here.
Tools that Perform an Epistemic Function
Some tools can provide us with knowledge. Another way of putting
this is to say that in the sciences tools are often not simply regarded
as generating data, but as generating knowledge by means of data. The
question is what has to be in place such that they can do this. Let us
approach this question by looking at two groups of instruments of which
this is obviously true, namely measuring instruments and instruments
designed to enhance our observational capacities. Examples of the first
kind are thermometers, scales, and stop watches. Examples of the second
kind are microscopes or telescopes. Such tools can provide us with
knowledge about the amount or degree to which a given quality (e.g.,
temperature or weight) is present, or about the presence of entities or
phenomena that wouldn’t be detectable by means of the “naked” human
senses alone.4
But is there a sense in which a similar claim can be made about
concepts? I argue that there is. This is especially clear in psychology,
where, as mentioned above, common tools are psychometric tests, such
as intelligence tests. When we think of the notion of intelligence, features
that come to mind are logical reasoning, analytical skills, and creative
problem solving, each of which are exemplified by certain types of
behaviors in particular circumstances. Given our knowledge of such typical
indicators of intelligence, it is not far-fetched to try to devise a standardized
test that measures intelligence by way of those indicators, thereby allowing
us to determine the degree of intelligence of a particular person. In other
4 Heidelberger (1998) refers to these two types of instruments as representational and
productive tools, respectively.
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words, what are regarded as typical behavioral indicators of a trait like
intelligence are going to make their way into a test that is designed to
measure this trait. The presuppositions in question are conceptual. And
the test may be regarded as a psychological tool. This suggests a close
relationship between the two, in that psychological tools like intelligence
tests are implementations of particular types of conceptual assumptions.
For example, say that our notion of intelligence involves the operational
definition that if a person X is presented with a certain type of task they
will be regarded as intelligent if and only if they do well on that task.
This corresponds directly to a possible tool for determining a person’s
intelligence.
What was just said will immediately provoke the response that this
kind of operationism or logical behaviorism not only relies on a dated
theory of meaning, but also defines the property under investigation by
means of the test, thereby making it hard to see how the test could help
us find out something new about the property in question. In response,
I would like to emphasize again that I am not claiming that the meaning
of a concept like intelligence can be reduced to the response behavior
on a psychometric test. If it did, then, trivially, a test would not have to
be validated, since the test results, by definition, would instantiate the
property measured by the test. As mentioned earlier, my focus here will
not be on the issue of validation. Let me point out, however, that already
in the methodological discussions of the 1950s, some psychologists
acknowledged that a simple operational or criterion-oriented validation
was not going to be sufficient, since the objects or phenomena of interest
could usually not be exhaustively delineated by an empirical criterion.
Figuring out what the test was in fact measuring, therefore, required some
additional theoretical work, which the authors referred to as “construct
validation” (Cronbach and Meehl 1955).
With respect to the question of how to make sense of the epistemic
function of tools, given the fact that some such tools already makes
conceptual assumptions about their objects, we need to distinguish
between two types of epistemic interests (and, consequently, two types of
epistemic functions a tool might play): (1) that of finding out whether, and to
what extent, the phenomenon X is present in a given circumstance, and (2)
that of exploring the very nature of a given phenomenon X. If our interest
is in the first type of question, we will typically use an instrument that can
detect instances of the phenomenon, where this instrument will embody
some preconception about the phenomenon. Justifying that preconception
is what the validation of the instrument is all about. If, however, our interest
is in the second type of question, things are more complicated, since here
we have to rely on a tool prior to having validated it. It is this latter type of
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case that the thesis of this article is about.
How Tools Can Be Applied to Ill-Understood Objects
Some tools can provide us with knowledge about ill-understood
objects. In the previous subsection I have argued that tools can have
an epistemic function, and that concepts can be such tools, illustrating
both points with the example of psychometric tests. I concluded by
distinguishing between two types of epistemic functions tools might play:
that of measuring or detecting instances of phenomena, given a tool
that has already been validated or standardized, and that of empirically
exploring the nature of the phenomena prior to having a validated and/or
standardized tool. I drew attention to the fact that in the latter kind of
case scientists may only have a vague or inaccurate conception of the
phenomenon they are trying to investigate. My thesis is that such a
vague or inaccurate conception of the phenomenon under investigation
can be epistemically productive, provided that it is cast in the form of an
operational definition that allows researchers to intervene in the domain of
study.
Let me conclude this section by briefly explaining my notion of a
“purported” or “ill-understood” object or phenomenon. This notion may
appear odd since it seems to suggest that scientists can investigate
objects whose very existence is in question, that is, that they could
conceivably investigate non-existent objects. Clearly, this is not what I
have in mind. What I have in mind, rather, is that scientists can take
themselves to be investigating objects, which–on closer inspection–turn
out not to exist, or to be very different from the way they were thought
to be. What this suggests is that we need to distinguish between two
notions of “object”: (1) objects as mind-independent things in the world,
and (2) objects of research as conceptualized by scientists. Scientific
conceptualizations of objects or phenomena in the world can, of course,
be inaccurate, incomplete, or vague. Likewise, mind-independent objects
may not be very well understood. This draws attention to the fact that
scientists typically think of the objects and phenomena of their research as
mind-independent, yet the only way they have access to those objects and
phenomena is through their own conceptualizations. The question is how
such conceptualizations can be productive in the generation of knowledge
about what scientists will typically consider mind-independent objects.
The approach taken in this article bears some affinity with Hans-Jörg
Rheinberger’s account, in that he, too, focuses on the dynamics of
knowledge generation about specific objects (Rheinberger 1997). In
addition, my notions of purported or ill-understood objects are reminiscent
of Rheinberger’s epistemic objects, which he defines as objects that attract
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our epistemic curiosity. I am also sympathetic with Rheinberger’s idea
that an epistemic object can be turned into a technical object once it is
no longer investigated for its own sake, but rather used as a tool. As he
emphasizes, a technical object can, at any point in time, go back to being
an epistemic object. This can happen when the functioning of the tool itself
attracts our epistemic curiosity rather than being taken for granted. Where
my approach parts ways with Rheinberger’s however, is that he does not
distinguish between objects and concepts of objects. This means that it
is impossible, within his approach, to capture my contention that concepts
can be tools for the study of objects.5
V. THE CONCEPT OF IMPLICIT MEMORY AS A TOOL
In this section I will turn to a concrete example to illustrate my thesis
about the role of concepts as tools. The research I want to introduce
here has as its purported object the phenomenon of implicit memory.
The expression “implicit memory” was introduced into the literature in
1985 by the psychologists Graf and Schacter, following the discovery
of a particular data pattern, which resulted from a particular set of
experimental manipulations. The relationship between the experimental
manipulation and the data pattern subsequently provided researchers with
an operational definition of a concept. It is with this implicit conceptual
assumption that they proceeded to investigate the purported phenomenon
(implicit memory). In order to understand the nature of the research it
is important first to explicate the rationale of experimental research on
human memory.
Experiments in memory research typically consist of three parts: (1)
the study phase, (2) an intermediate phase and (3) the test phase
(see Lockhart 2000). During the study phase, subjects are exposed to
some experimental items (e.g., words, pictures, nonsense syllables) so
as to enable them to memorize them. The conditions under which this
takes place can be varied. For example, subjects might simply be asked
to memorize the items. Or they might be instructed to use particular
strategies, or they might be given some task without being told that the
aim is to memorize the items before them. The actions that researchers
take in order to create such learning conditions are also referred to as
“experimental manipulations.” During the test phase, memories of the
experimental items are elicited from the subject by means of a memory
test. There are different kinds of memory tests. The kinds of memory tests
that have traditionally been used are either recall or recognition tests.
5 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between my approach and
Rheinberger’s program of historical epistemology see Feest, under review.
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When subjects take such tests, they are explicitly asked to report what
they remember–or recognize–from the study phase. For this reason this
type of test is called an “explicit test.” Such tests can be contrasted with
another type of test, which has been used more recently (within the last
forty years or so). An example of such a test is one where the subject has
to decide whether a given string of letters on the computer screen is a
word. The subject is judged as having a memory of an item if the reaction
time is shorter for words from the test phase than for others. The subject
is not explicitly instructed to recall something. For this reason this type of
test is referred to as an “implicit test.”
It has been known since the early 1970s that prior exposure to an
experimental item increased the likelihood of doing well on an implicit
test for that item, even if the subject has no explicit recollection of the
exposure. In the early 1980s, there was increasing evidence for the
existence of so-called “experimental dissociations” between the results
of explicit and implicit memory tests. This means that the results on the
two kinds of tests differed even though the learning conditions in the
study phase had been identical. For example, (1) a normal subject has
difficulties explicitly remembering verbal items a week after the learning
phase, while performance on an implicit memory test is as good as it
was right after the learning phase,6 and (2) results on explicit tests can be
influenced by certain variations of the conditions during the study phase
(for example, elaborative study conditions), which do not appear to affect
the performance on implicit tests. (3) The experimental dissociations were
found in patients that suffered from amnesia (typically patients with lesions
in the hippocampus).
The discovery of the dissociation gave rise to experimental studies of
the phenomenon, which soon came to be called “implicit memory.” My
thesis here is that the conditions that produced the dissociation were
treated as an operational definition of the concept of the phenomenon, and
that this definition, in turn, functioned as an (evolving) tool for the study of
the phenomenon. The first of the above conditions represents the most
basic definition:
Q1 → (Q3 iff Q2) (modeled on Carnap 1936)
(If a human subject is exposed to a given learning paradigm and then
tested with an explicit and implicit memory test, then implicit memory is
present iff there is a functional dissociation between the results on the
implicit and the explicit memory test.)
6 “Normal,” in the context of psychological research, usually means “not brain-damaged.”
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When we look at how it was in fact used in the further research
about the purported phenomenon, it is clear that the concept was further
fine-tuned in terms of the other two conditions (see above) and this in
turn played a role in research. This can be illustrated by means of studies
that were reported by Graf and Schacter (1985). The authors reported
dissociations between implicit and explicit memory tests. However, on the
other hand they also reported that the priming effect was more pronounced
under the elaborative study condition than under the non-elaborative
study condition. This went against the assumption that implicit memory is
unaffected by variations in the study condition. Consequently, the authors
discussed the possibility that the observed dissociation might not be due to
implicit memory. In order to investigate this question, they then conducted
another experiment in which they replicated the experiment with patients
who suffered from amnesia. This experiment once again produced the
experimental dissociations. As a result of that experiment, the authors then
cautiously concluded that their findings were indicative of implicit memory
after all, thereby obviously relaxing the assumption that implicit memory
could not be affected by study conditions.
This case is illuminating in several respects. First, the example
illustrates that despite the rather fragmented understanding of the
phenomenon under investigation, there was early on a presupposition
to the effect that there was indeed one phenomenon to be studied,
such that it could be asked whether a given experimental result was
indeed indicative of the phenomenon. Hence, we may say that there
was a general understanding amongst researchers that they were all
using the expression “implicit memory” to refer to one and the same
thing. Second, it illustrates the function played by paradigmatic conditions
of application of the expression in the early stages of investigating the
corresponding (purported) phenomenon. Hence, we may say that there
was a shared understanding that the phenomenon under investigation
was to be empirically individuated by means of particular experimental
operations, insofar as they resulted in particular data. Third, it shows
that researchers were willing to relax one of their initial assumptions,
thereby revising the initial concept. Hence, we may say that at least some
presuppositions of the research were changed as a result of the research.
VI. THE TOOL IN CONTEXT
Having looked at the way in which the typical criteria of application may
be modified or adjusted in the research process, I would like to conclude
with a brief discussion of the question of whether and how ideas about the
referent underwent changes as research on the phenomenon proceeded.
This is to show two things: First, the fact that no full-blown theory of
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implicit memory existed when the research started, and that scientists
had to revert to operational definitions in order to empirically individuate
instances of the purported phenomenon, does not mean that we can
neglect the role of theoretical considerations in this research. Second, the
way in which theoretical ideas about the nature of the referent changed
illustrates the kind of scenario already mentioned above, namely that there
is no a priori way of predicting the effects of changing ideas about the
nature of a phenomenon, that is, whether scientists will conclude that
the phenomenon they thought they were investigating does not exist, or
whether they will change their minds about what the phenomenon is like.
When the dissociation between performances on explicit and
implicit memory tests was first discovered, memory was discussed in
terms of long- and short-term memory (e.g., Baddeley 1976). Within
neuropsychology, it had also been noted that amnesiacs appeared to
exhibit dissociations between long- and short-term memory performances
(Baddeley and Warrington 1972). The distinction between long- and
short-term memory was supplemented with the notion that there might
be two kinds of long-term-memory, one “episodic” and one “semantic”
(e.g., Tulving 1983), where the former was thought to be responsible for
our ability to remember biographical episodes, whereas semantic memory
was thought to be memory for facts, independently of how knowledge of
such facts was acquired. The items in semantic memory were thought
to be stored in a network of interconnected nodes, according to their
semantic relationships. Faced with the experimental dissociations between
reports on explicit and implicit tests, reported above, Tulving et al. (1982)
hypothesized that performance on recognition tests (i.e., on explicit tests)
was supported by a recollection of the study phase, that is, by episodic
memory. This raised the question of whether performance on the priming
test (i.e., on implicit tests) might be due to semantic memory. However,
by 1982, it was no longer clear whether this explanation could hold up,
as there was now also evidence for sensory priming (i.e., that the priming
effect occurred not by virtue of the meaning of a word, but by virtue of
some more superficial feature, such as the way it was being presented;
e.g. Jacoby and Dallas 1981). This led some to think of implicit memory
as such a memory system, which was responsible for both semantic and
sensory priming.
Subsequent researchers in the field can roughly be divided into two
groups: One group questions whether the data in question (i.e., the
priming data) should be viewed as indicative of memory phenomenon
at all (e.g., Roediger 2003). The other group of theorists still talks about
implicit memory systems (e.g., Schacter 1999). However, Schacter now
thinks of implicit memory as a perceptual representation system (PRS),
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a system that has several domain-specific subsystems, which are each
responsible for processing different sensory features of the experimental
items (thereby explaining the dissociations between and within sense
modalities), all of which work independently of the semantic (explicit)
processing of the items (thereby explaining the dissociations between
explicit and implicit tests).
The point here is that even among those who believe in the existence
of an implicit memory system, the kind of phenomenon they now believe
exists is significantly different from what they believed implicit memory was
twenty-five years ago. While the term was initially supposed to refer to a
system, which was taken to function independently of whatever systems
process specific modalities, it is now (by some) taken to refer to a system
that specifically processes sensory aspects of experimental items. Thus,
the scientific conception of this phenomenon appears to have incorporated
some of the features that it was initially contrasted with. It bears stressing,
though, that the changed conception of the referent was brought about, in
part, by research that relied on a particular operational definition, that is, on
a particular preconception about how to empirically identify the purported
referent by means of an experimental operation. I have argued that this
(preliminary) preconception functioned as a research tool.
VII. SUMMARY
I would like to conclude by placing the topic of this paper in the broader
context of some issues in philosophy of experimentation. Starting with
Ian Hacking in the early 1980s, the line of debate has often been cast
as being between those who emphasize the primacy of theory and those
that emphasize that experiments have a life of their own (Hacking 1983).
Hacking in particular took the shift from theory to experimental practice
to also be a shift away from a philosophical preoccupation with language.
While sharing some of Hacking’s fundamental intuitions, my aim in this
article has been to put language back on the agenda. Even if we don’t
think that the primary aim of experiments is theory-testing, we still have to
make room for the way in which scientific conceptualizations enter into the
experimental process. On the thesis argued for here, preliminary scientific
concepts may be viewed as tentative representations of purported objects.
However, more importantly, they are tools that allow for the experimental
intervention into the domain of study. As I showed, such tools may well
be informed by existing theories of the domain. Yet, they also function
in a space that is more open and dynamic than suggested by traditional
notions of theory and theory-testing. By providing an analysis of this open
and dynamic quality in terms of the notion of operational definitions, I have
shown how concepts can figure as tools for the experimental generation of
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knowledge.
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